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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation ("BCF "), 
a Delaware corporation based in New Jersey, announced its 
fourth quarter and full fiscal year results for 1994 on 
September 20, 1994. The results were below the investment 
community's expectations, and BCF's common stock fell 
sharply, losing approximately 30% in one day. Within a day 
of the initial announcement, the first investor suit was filed. 
In the next few days, the company made additional 
explanatory disclosures, and the stock price fell even 
further. More investor suits were filed. The action at hand 
is the product of the consolidation of these suits. 
 
BCF and certain of its principal officers and directors 
were sued under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"). 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78j(b), 78(t)(a). Section 10(b) provides a broad prohibition 
on the use of "manipulative or deceptive devices" in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 15 
U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section 20, in turn, provides liability for 
"controlling persons." 15 U.S.C. § 78(t)(a). Plaintiffs assert 
that they represent the class of investors who purchased 
BCF common stock between October 4, 1993, and 
September 23, 1994. Plaintiffs claim that, as a result of 
BCF's misleading statements and omissions during the 
class period, the company's stock price was artificially 
inflated. 
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The district court dismissed the case both for failure to 
state claims on which relief could be granted and for failure 
to plead those claims with adequate particularity. The court 
also denied plaintiffs' request that they be allowed to 
amend and replead their claims in the event of a dismissal. 
 
On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the dismissal of four of 
their six original claims. Since the fourth claim has two 
distinct parts, we describe the four claims as five. 
According to plaintiffs, the district court erred in ruling: (1) 
that the alleged earnings overstatements during fiscal year 
1994 were not materially misleading because no violation of 
GAAP had been shown and that, in any event, the claim 
stated was, at most, a claim for negligence; (2) that the 
failure to disclose that the company had not received its 
usual discounts in its inventory build-up in January and 
February of 1994 was "largely irrelevant"; (3) that 
overstatements regarding the sales attributable to an extra, 
53rd week in 1993 were not actionable; (4) that 
management's expression of "comfort" with certain specific 
earnings forecasts by analysts was not actionable because 
BCF did not "adopt" the analysts' estimates; and (5) that a 
statement that the company's earnings would continue to 
grow faster than revenues was not actionable because it 
was no more than "puffery." Plaintiffs argue that these were 
proper, viable claims under Section 10(b) and that they 
pled facts in support of their claims that met the 
particularity requirements for fraud claims. As afinal 
matter, plaintiffs contend that even if the district court's 
dismissal of their claims on particularity grounds was 
justified, they should have been given leave to amend and 
replead their claims. 
 
We affirm the district court's dismissals on claims (2), (3), 
and (5). Claims (1) and (4) were properly dismissed on 
particularity grounds, but we disagree with the district 
court's holding that these claims could not be viable. Since 
leave to amend appears to have been denied on the grounds 
of futility alone, we hold that plaintiffs may amend their 
complaint and replead claims (1) and (4). 
 
I. 
 
BCF is one of the leading retailers of coats in the United 
States. Its specialty is selling brand name clothes at 
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discount prices. By mid-1993, BCF was operating a total of 
185 stores in 39 states. The stores ranged in size from 
16,000 to 133,000 square feet and featured outerwear 
(coats, jackets, and raincoats) and complete lines of 
clothing for men, women, and children. 
 
BCF opened in 1924, under the management of Abe 
Milstein, and specialized in wholesale outerwear. In the 
1950's, Abe's son, Monroe, joined the business. In 1972, 
BCF acquired a coat factory and outlet store in Burlington, 
New Jersey, and began operation as a retailer. 
 
BCF is a public company traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange. During the class period for this case, the average 
daily trading volume for BCF common stock was 100,000 
shares. Plaintiffs assert that BCF's securities are actively 
followed by numerous analysts and that the market in BCF 
stock was "efficient" at all periods relevant to this case.1 
 
BCF's fortunes have been on the rise over the past 
decade. BCF's 1992 Annual Report stated that "[t]he 
Company's revenues have increased each year for the past 
13 years, from $24 million in 1978 to over $1 billion in 
1992." Further, BCF's earnings per share rose from $0.60 
in 1990 to $1.06 in 1993. 
 
BCF's top corporate officers, some of whom are 
defendants in this case, hold large portions of BCF's 
outstanding common stock. This seems especially true of 
those officers who are members of the Milstein family, 
which as a whole owned approximately 55% of BCF's 
common stock.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Asserting that the market in BCF's stock was "efficient" is relevant to 
plaintiffs, such as those here, who are attempting to use the "fraud on 
the market" theory to satisfy the reliance requirement in a Section 10(b) 
claim. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, The Crash, 
and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 907, 908-12 
(1989) (describing both the "fraud on the market" theory and its link to 
the efficient market hypothesis); Jonathan Macey, et al., Lessons From 
Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of 
Basic v. Levinson, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1017 (1991); see also n.8, infra. 
 
2. As of May 11, 1994, there were 41,119,463 shares of BCF's common 
stock outstanding. The stock ownership figures and percentages are 
those alleged in the Complaint. 
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The defendant-officers are: (1) Monroe G. Milstein, BCF's 
chief executive officer and chairman of the board, who 
owned approximately 30.7% of the stock; (2) Stephen E. 
Milstein, a vice-president, director, and general 
merchandise manager, who owned approximately 4.9% of 
the stock; (3) Andrew R. Milstein, a vice-president, director, 
and executive merchandise manager, who owned 
approximately 5.4% of the stock; (4) Robert R. LaPenta, 
controller, and chief accounting officer; and (5) Mark A. 
Nesci, vice-president for store operations, director, and 
chief operating officer. 
 
This case was brought as a class action on behalf of all 
purchasers of BCF common stock during the period from 
October 4, 1993, through and including September 23,  
1994.3 Plaintiffs claim that during this period defendants 
(the company and the individual officer-defendants), 
through a number of misstatements in and omissions from 
disclosures made to the public, defrauded plaintiffs into 
purchasing BCF stock at artificially high prices. 
 
Plaintiffs explain that the individual defendants, as a 
result of their positions of control in the company, were 
able to manipulate BCF's press releases and other 
disclosures so as to deceive the market into overpricing the 
company's stock. Allegedly, the individual defendants 
behaved in this manner so as to: 
 
(i) artificially inflate and maintain the market price of 
BCF's common stock during the Class Period and 
thereby cause plaintiffs and the other members of the 
Class to purchase such common stock at artificially 
inflated prices and, in the case of certain of the 
defendants, to personally gain from the sale of inflated 
stock; and 
 
(ii) protect, perpetuate and enhance their executive 
positions and the substantial compensation, prestige 
and other perquisites of executive compensation 
obtained thereby. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Excluded from the class are defendants, their immediate families, the 
officers, directors, and affiliates of BCF, members of their immediate 
families, and any trusts or entities which they control. 
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Complaint, ¶ 15. 
 
Defendants who are alleged to have personally gained 
from selling their stock during the class period are Andrew 
R. Milstein (who sold 10,000 shares on March 17 and 
March 21, 1994, at $27.75 per share), Mark A. Nesci (who 
sold 10,000 shares on March 18 and March 25, 1994, at 
$27.50), and Robert R. LaPenta (who sold 1,500 shares on 
March 4, 1994 at $28.00 per share and 2,500 shares on 
April 6, 1994, at $26.25 per share). The price drop between 
September 20 and September 23, 1994 -- the days of the 
announcements that allegedly caused a correction in the 
stock price to reflect the true state of BCF's fortunes -- 
was from a high of $23.25 to a low of $13.63. Assuming 
that the price drop of approximately $10 was due entirely 
to the correction of false information, Andrew Milstein's and 
Mark Nesci's trading gains would each amount to 
approximately $100,000, and Robert LaPenta's gains would 
be approximately $40,000. 
 
II. 
 
On September 20, 1994, BCF reported its year-end 
revenues and earnings for fiscal 1994. These results were 
below the market's expectations, with the earnings per 
share for fiscal 1994 being $1.12 as compared to the $1.37 
that analysts had been predicting. On September 20 itself, 
the price of BCF stock fell almost 30%, from $23.25 to 
$15.75 per share. Between September 20 and September 
23 both BCF and outside analysts attempted to explain the 
reasons for the worse-than-expected results. By the close of 
the market on September 23, 1994, the price of BCF stock 
had fallen to $13.63. 
 
The first of plaintiffs' three suits was filed within a day of 
the first price drop on September 20, alleging that BCF had 
violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Two 
other similar actions were filed two days later, on 
September 23, 1994. The three actions were consolidated, 
and the consolidation resulted in the filing, in January 
1995, of the "Consolidated Amended and Supplemental 
Class Action Complaint" (the "Complaint"). 
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Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted and under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) for failure to plead 
fraud with particularity. 
 
The district court determined that the Complaint 
contained six distinct claims: 
 
First, plaintiffs allege that BCF's 1993 annual report 
misrepresented the impact of an additional week (the 
"fifty-third week") on the fiscal year-end sales revenue. 
. . . 
 
Second, plaintiffs allege that defendants failed to 
announce that the discounts BCF received on 
merchandise purchased for January, 1994, and 
February, 1994, were substantially less than the 
discounts received in previous years. . . . 
 
Third, plaintiffs claim that "during each quarter during 
the Class Period, defendants overstated BCF's profits 
from operations by 2-3 cents EPS (earnings per share) 
per quarter by failing to properly match their operating 
expenses with sales." . . . 
 
Fourth, plaintiffs allege that defendants, in a press 
release of March 1, 1994, stated that BCF's store 
expansion program would be internally funded, when, 
in truth, BCF was borrowing heavily to fund that 
expansion. . . . 
 
Fifth, plaintiffs claim that defendants, in promoting the 
store expansion program, asserted in various reports 
. . . that 95% of all new stores were profitable within 
six months, and that the new stores were opened 
efficiently and without great expense. . . . 
 
Finally, plaintiffs allege that throughout the putative 
class period, defendants championed their growth in 
revenue, profit margins and earnings, but did not 
disclose shortcomings in their accounting and cost 
control systems. 
 
(Dist. Ct. Op. at 3). 
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On February 20, 1996, the district court dismissed 
plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b). 
Plaintiffs had requested leave to amend should the 
Complaint be dismissed, but the district court dismissed 
the action in its "entirety." 
 
Plaintiffs then took this appeal. Plaintiffs contest the 
district court's dismissal of four of the six claims.4 Plaintiffs 
also challenge the court's denial of their request for leave to 
amend. 
 
III. 
 
A. Section 10(b) Claims 
 
Plaintiffs assert claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of 
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a), and Rule 10b- 
5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The 
private right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-55 
reaches beyond statements and omissions made in a 
registration statement or prospectus or in connection with 
an initial distribution of securities and creates liability for 
false or misleading statements or omissions of material fact 
that affect trading on the secondary market. See Central 
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994); Shaw v. Digital Equip. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The claims abandoned on appeal are (1) that BCF, by stating that the 
company " `[c]ontinue[s] to anticipate funding most of [its] growth 
through internal profits[,]' " misrepresented "that BCF's store expansion 
program would be internally funded, when in truth BCF was borrowing 
heavily to fund that expansion" and (2) that "defendants, in promoting 
the store expansion program, [misrepresented] . . . that 95% of all new 
stores were profitable within six months, and that the new stores were 
opened efficiently and without great expense." 
 
5. Section 10(b) prohibits the "use or employ[ment], in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security, . . . [of] any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Rule 
10b-5, in turn, makes it illegal "[t]o make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). 
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Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1216-17 (1st Cir. 1996); Eckstein v. 
Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 
The first step for a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff is to establish 
that defendant made a materially false or misleading 
statement or omitted to state a material fact necessary to 
make a statement not misleading. See In re Phillips 
Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1243 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1018 
(5th Cir. 1996). Next, plaintiff must establish that 
defendant acted with scienter and that plaintiff's reliance 
on defendant's misstatement caused him or her injury. See 
Phillips, 881 F.2d at 1244; San Leandro Emergency Medical 
Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 75 F.3d 
801, 808 (2d Cir. 1996). Finally, since the claim being 
asserted is a "fraud" claim, plaintiff must satisfy the 
heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b). See Suna v. Bailey Corp., 107 F.3d 64, 68 
(1st Cir. 1997). 
 
Rule 9(b) requires that "[i]n all averments of fraud or 
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity." This particularity 
requirement has been rigorously applied in securities fraud 
cases. See Suna, 107 F.3d at 73; Gross v. Summa Four, 
Inc., 93 F.3d 987, 991 (1st Cir. 1996). For example, where 
plaintiffs allege that defendants distorted certain data 
disclosed to the public by using unreasonable accounting 
practices, we have required plaintiffs to state what the 
unreasonable practices were and how they distorted the 
disclosed data. See Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 
284-85 (3d Cir. 1992). Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading 
standard gives defendants notice of the claims against 
them, provides an increased measure of protection for their 
reputations, and reduces the number of frivolous suits 
brought solely to extract settlements. See Tuchman v. DSC 
Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994); 
Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1989). Despite 
Rule 9(b)'s stringent requirements, however, we have stated 
that "courts should be `sensitive' to the fact that application 
of the Rule prior to discovery `may permit sophisticated 
defrauders to successfully conceal the details of their 
fraud.' " Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 284 (citing Christidis v. First 
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Pa. Mortgage Trust, 717 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
Accordingly, the normally rigorous particularity rule has 
been relaxed somewhat where the factual information is 
peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge or control. See 
Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 285. But even under a relaxed 
application of Rule 9(b), boilerplate and conclusory 
allegations will not suffice. Id. Plaintiffs must accompany 
their legal theory with factual allegations that make their 
theoretically viable claim plausible. Id. 
 
Rule 9(b) also says that "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and 
other condition of mind of a person may be averred 
generally." The meaning of this sentence has been the 
source of considerable debate. The Second Circuit, among 
others, has emphasized that although state of mind may be 
"averred generally," a plaintiff alleging securities fraud must 
still allege specific facts that give rise to a "strong inference" 
that the defendant possessed the requisite intent. See, e.g., 
Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1995); 
see also Suna, 107 F.3d at 68; Tuchman, 14 F.3d at 1068. 
"The requisite `strong inference' of fraud may be established 
either (a) by alleging facts to show that defendants had both 
motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging 
facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of 
conscious misbehavior or recklessness." Acito, 47 F.3d at 
52; see also Dileo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th 
Cir. 1990) ("People sometimes act irrationally, but indulging 
ready inferences of irrationality would too easily allow the 
inference that ordinary business reverses are fraud"). 
 
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit has rejected such a 
requirement that plaintiff allege facts from which intent to 
commit fraud may be inferred. See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (in banc). In GlenFed, 
the court argued that since the second sentence of Rule 
9(b) states that "malice, intent, knowledge, and other 
condition of mind may be averred generally," the Rule 
leaves no room for requiring specific facts to be pled. Id. at 
1545-47. 
 
We agree with the Second Circuit's approach. Cf. In re 
ValueVision Int'l, Inc., Sec. Litig., 896 F. Supp. 434, 446 
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting the Third Circuit's silence on the 
issue). While state of mind may be averred generally, 
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plaintiffs must still allege facts that show the court their 
basis for inferring that the defendants acted with "scienter." 
Otherwise, strike suits based on no more than plaintiffs' 
detection of a few negligently made errors in company 
documents or statements (errors detected in the aftermath 
of a stock price drop) could survive the pleading threshold 
and subject public companies to unneeded litigation 
expenditures. Public companies make large quantities of 
information available to the public, as a result of both 
mandatory disclosure requirements and self-initiated 
voluntary disclosure. Cf. Roberta Romano, The Genius of 
American Corporate Law 93-95 (1993). Large volumes of 
disclosure make for a high likelihood of at least a few 
negligent errors. To allow plaintiffs and their attorneys to 
subject companies to wasteful litigation based on the 
detection of a few negligently made errors found 
subsequent to a drop in stock price would be contrary to 
the goals of Rule 9(b), which include the deterrence of 
frivolous litigation based on accusations that could hurt the 
reputations of those being attacked.6 See Tuchman, 14 F.3d 
at 1067; In re Discovery Zone Sec. Litig., 943 F. Supp. 924, 
934 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 
Plaintiffs' Complaint advances numerous claims of 
nondisclosure and misstatement. On appeal, the myriad 
allegations have been whittled down to five: (1) that BCF 
overstated certain quarterly earnings reports; (2) that BCF 
wrongfully failed to disclose the receipt of certain reduced 
discounts on purchases; (3) that BCF misrepresented the 
sales attributable to the 53rd week of 1993; and (4) & (5) 
that BCF made certain forward-looking statements without 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The parties do not contend that the recently enacted Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "Reform Act") applies to this case. Cf. 
Hockey v. Medhekar, 1997 WL 203704, *3-4 (N.D. Cal.) (holding that the 
Reform Act applies only to class actions filed after December 22, 1995). 
We note, however, that Section 21(D)(b)(2) of the Reform Act requires 
that complaints brought under Rule 10b-5 "state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the 
requisite state of mind." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2); see also Friedberg v. 
Discreet Logic, Inc., 1997 WL 109228, *5 (D. Mass.); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat 
Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. Law. 975, 978-79 (1996). 
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a reasonable basis.7 Plaintiffs have further alleged that the 
nondisclosures and misstatements were made with 
fraudulent intent, that defendants' conduct artificially 
inflated the market price of BCF stock, and that this fraud 
on the market caused plaintiffs to suffer damages.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Under existing law, where purchasers or sellers of stock have been 
able to identify a specific false representation of material fact or omission 
that makes a disclosed statement materially misleading, a private right 
of action lies under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See Hayes v. Gross, 
982 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs, however, did not merely 
assert that defendants made affirmative misstatements in and omissions 
from disclosed statements. They also alleged that defendants had failed 
to comply with affirmative disclosure requirements under "Item 303 of 
Regulation S-K." Complaint, ¶ 12. Plaintiffs tell us that under Item 303 
defendants had a duty to "report all trends, demands or uncertainties 
that were reasonably likely to (i) impact BCF's liquidity; (ii) impact 
BCF's net sales, revenue and/or income; and/or (iii) cause previously 
reported financial information not to be indicative of future operating 
results." Complaint, ¶ 12; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.303. 
 
It is an open issue whether violations of Item 303 create an 
independent cause of action for private plaintiffs. See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 
1222 (declining to reach the issue); In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 
922, 930 n.6 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); In re Canandaigua Sec. Litig., 944 
F. Supp. 1202, 1209 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("far from certain that the 
requirement that there be a duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5 may be 
satisfied by importing the disclosure duties from S-K 303"). 
 
We do not need to reach this issue, however, because it has not been 
raised on appeal. 
 
8. The "fraud on the market" theory accords plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5 
class actions a rebuttable presumption of reliance if plaintiffs bought or 
sold their securities in an "efficient" market. See Donald C. Langevoort, 
Theories, Assumptions and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency 
Revisited, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851, 889-91 (1992); see also Shaw, 82 F.3d 
at 1218. Plaintiffs using this theory need not show that they actually 
knew of the communication that contained the misrepresentation or 
omission. Instead, plaintiffs are accorded the presumption of reliance 
based on the theory that in an efficient market the misinformation 
directly affects the stock prices at which the investor trades and thus, 
through the inflated or deflated price, causes injury even in the absence 
of direct reliance. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 
(1988) (theory presumes that the plaintiffs relied on market integrity to 
accurately and adequately incorporate the company's value into the price 
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Defendants counter that none of the statements or 
omissions identified by plaintiffs was materially false, 
misleading, or otherwise actionable. Defendants protest 
that: 
 
This lawsuit constitutes a frivolous attempt by 
appellants to extort money from a healthy, successful 
company that saw its revenues and earnings per share 
increase steadily from fiscal 1990 through fiscal 1994. 
The Company's only alleged sin is to have reported 
accurately on September 20, 1994 its year-end 
revenues and earnings for fiscal 1994, which, while 
surpassing the performance of any prior year in its 
history, failed to meet the earnings-per-share 
projections of a handful of bullish securities analysts. 
 
(Appellees' Br. at 18) (internal citations omitted). We 
address each of plaintiffs' claims in turn. 
 
(1) Earnings Overstatements 
 
Plaintiffs allege that "during each quarter during the 
Class Period, defendants overstated BCF's profits from 
operations by 2-3 cents [earnings per share] per quarter by 
failing to properly match their operating expenses with 
sales." Complaint, ¶ 73(c). The Complaint explains: 
 
In order to achieve their goal of inflating the Company's 
stock price, defendants manipulated BCF's financial 
statements through improper and misleading 
accounting practices in violation of GAAP. Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts 6 (SFAC [No.] 6), set 
forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), provides that expenses -- which are defined as 
decreases in assets or increases in liabilities during a 
period resulting from delivery of goods, rendering of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of the security); see also Langevoort, Market Efficiency at 890-91. 
Therefore, in order to avail themselves of the fraud on the market theory 
and the benefit of not having to plead specific reliance on the alleged 
misstatement or omission, plaintiffs have to allege that the stock in 
question traded on an open and efficient market. See Hayes v. Gross, 
982 F.2d 104, 107 (3d Cir. 1992); Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 
(3d Cir. 1986). It is undisputed that plaintiffs have met this burden. 
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services, or other activities constituting the enterprise's 
central operations -- must be matched with revenues 
resulting from those expenses. See SFAC[No.] 6 [ ]. The 
matching principle requires that all expenses incurred 
in the generating of revenue should be recognized in 
the same accounting period as the revenues are 
recognized. Defendants violated SFAC [No.] 6 by failing 
to properly account for the expenses associated with 
BCF's purchases of inventory during the Class Period, 
and thereby artificially inflated the reported net income 
and earnings per share during the first, second and 
third quarters of fiscal year 1994. Because of the 
Company's inadequate financial and accounting 
controls, defendants were able to and did, in fact, . . . 
materially understate BCF's expenses, on a quarter- 
by-quarter basis during fiscal year 1994, and thereby 
overstate very significantly during the Class Period 
BCF's profitability, earnings and prospects for fiscal 
year 1994. 
 
Complaint, ¶ 67 (emphasis added). 
 
The court dismissed the earnings overstatement claim 
because it "fail[ed] to allege how defendants intentionally or 
recklessly deviated from generally accepted accounting 
principles." (Dist. Ct. Op. at 19). Although defendants 
argued that plaintiffs had failed to state a legally cognizable 
claim because they did not point to a violation of GAAP, the 
district court's decision to dismiss this claim is most easily 
read as being on Rule 9(b) grounds alone, i.e., a failure to 
plead with particularity. However, to read the district 
court's opinion as dismissing the claim under Rule 9(b) 
alone would be inconsistent with the court's simultaneous 
failure to grant leave to amend on the ground of futility. See 
Section B, infra. Hence, we review the district court's 
dismissal as if it were based on both Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 
9(b). In evaluating the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal we assume 
that the district court accepted defendants' arguments on 
the issue. 
 
(i) Rule 12(b)(6) 
 
Defendants argue here, as they did before the district 
court, that the earnings overstatement claim fails under 
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Rule 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
may be granted only if, accepting all well pleaded 
allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in 
the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled 
to relief. Bartholomew v. Fischl, 782 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d 
Cir. 1986). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will 
ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to 
offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 
 
Defendants argue that their earnings statements could 
not have been materially misleading because BCF's 
accounting practices were consistent with GAAP.9 
Defendants assert that violations of mere accounting 
"concepts" such as SFAC No. 6, which is what plaintiffs 
have alleged, are not violations of GAAP, and therefore are 
not enough to give rise to disclosure violations under the 
securities laws.10 Defendants suggest that the earnings 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Defendants do not attempt to suggest that the alleged earnings per 
share overstatements of 2-3 cents themselves should be ruled 
immaterial. Indeed, earnings reports are among the pieces of data that 
investors find most relevant to their investment decisions. In deciding 
whether to buy or sell a security, reasonable investors often rely on 
estimates or projections of the underlying firm's future earnings. See 
Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1989). 
Information concerning the firm's current and past earnings is likely to 
be relevant in predicting what future earnings might be. See Glassman 
v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 626 (1st Cir. 1996). Thus, 
information about a company's past and current earnings is likely to be 
highly "material." Cf. Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and 
Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1335, 1355 (market places an "enormous emphasis" on earnings 
reports); Victor Brudney and William W. Bratton, Corporate Finance A-1 
(1993) ("The issuance of an income statement is often preceded or 
followed by increased market activity in the company's shares."). 
 
10. GAAP is not a set of rigid rules ensuring identical treatment of 
identical transactions, but rather characterizes the range of reasonable 
alternatives that management can use. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. 
Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 544 (1979); Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, 
Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1021 (5th Cir. 1996). "GAAP [is] an amalgam of 
statements issued by the [American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants] through the successive groups it has established to 
promulgate accounting principles: the Committee on Accounting 
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overstatement claim is based on no more than the fact that 
BCF uses one accounting method to value merchandise on 
a quarterly basis (the "gross profit" method) and a different 
method to value its merchandise on an annual basis (the 
"retail inventory" method). In addition, defendants inform 
us that the market knew about this practice because the 
use of the different methods was disclosed to investors in 
BCF's quarterly 10-Q filings with the SEC. 
 
If BCF is correct (a) that the alleged overstatements of 
quarterly earnings are merely the result of the use of valid, 
accepted, and understood accounting methods, and (b) that 
this concurrent use of different accounting methods was 
fully and adequately disclosed to the market (alleged here 
to be efficient), plaintiffs' claims would likely fail. However, 
at this stage, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the 
alleged earnings overstatements can be fully explained by 
BCF's use of different accounting methods for analyzing 
quarterly versus annual data (even assuming that these 
were fully disclosed to the market). Moreover, assuming 
that consistency with GAAP is enough to preclude liability, 
it is a factual question whether BCF's accounting practices 
were consistent with GAAP. Cf. Discovery, 943 F. Supp. at 
935 n.9 ("This Court finds that whether FASB[SFAC] No. 6 
constitutes GAAP is best resolved by expert testimony, and 
thus should not be addressed on a motion to dismiss"); cf. 
also In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 709 n.9 (3d 
Cir. 1996). And, of course, since the claim at issue was 
dismissed at the pleading stage, we are required to credit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Procedure, the Accounting Principles Board, and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board [(FASB)]. . . . GAAP include[s] broad 
statements of accounting principles amounting to aspirational norms as 
well as more specific guidelines and illustrations. The lack of an official 
compilation allows for some debate over whether particular 
announcements are encompassed within GAAP." Bily v. Arthur Young & 
Co., 834 P.2d 745, 750-51 (Cal. 1992); see also Providence Hosp. of 
Toppenish v. Shalala, 52 F.3d 213, 218 n.7 (9th Cir. 1995). At issue here 
is SFAC No. 6, which although issued by FASB, is allegedly not GAAP -- 
at least according to defendants. But cf. Anthony Phillips et al., Basic 
Accounting for Lawyers 39 (4th ed. 1988) (including FASB's Statements 
of Financial Concepts within its table of "Sources of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles"). 
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plaintiffs' allegations rather than defendants' responses. 
See, e.g., Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 706 ("we must accept as 
true plaintiffs' factual allegations, and we may affirm the 
district court's dismissals only if it appears certain that 
plaintiffs can prove no set of facts entitling them to relief") 
(citation omitted). Consequently, we cannot sustain the 
district court's dismissal of this claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 
 
(ii) Rule 9(b) 
 
The district court specifically ruled that the earnings 
overstatement claim failed the particularity requirements of 
Rule 9(b). Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to plead here (1) a 
specific false representation of material fact, (2) knowledge 
of its falsity by the person who made it, (3) ignorance of its 
falsity by the person to whom it was made, (4) the maker's 
intention that it should be acted upon, and (5) detrimental 
reliance by the plaintiff. Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 710. The 
district court held that plaintiffs did not comply with Rule 
9(b) because they failed to allege: 
 
how defendants intentionally or recklessly deviated 
from generally accepted accounting principles. The 
Amended Consolidated Complaint is devoid of any 
indication as to the particular error(s), [and/or] the 
standard(s) from which defendants deviated and even 
the allegation of scienter. 
 
(Dist. Ct. Op. at 19) (emphasis added). The court concluded 
that plaintiffs had offered no more than "rote allegations of 
fraud predicated on the drop in price of BCF stock," and 
that these allegations fell below the "who, what, when, 
where and how" elements necessary to establish an 
intentional or reckless misstatement or omission under 
Rule 9(b). (Dist. Ct. Op. at 19). See Dileo, 901 F.2d at 627 
(equating the particularity required by Rule 9(b) with "the 
first paragraph of any newspaper story"). In addition, 
according to the court, plaintiffs' claim sounded in 
"negligence." (Dist. Ct. Op. at 18). 
 
We disagree that plaintiffs' claim, at this stage, boils 
down to a blanket assertion of fraud premised on no more 
than a drop in stock price.11 Plaintiffs have alleged that 2-3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The issue is not whether there was a deviation from any set of formal 
accounting practices, but whether BCF's earnings statements were 
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cent overstatements of earnings occurred in the company's 
public announcements of results for the first, second, and 
third quarters of 1994 and that these overstatements 
occurred because BCF failed to account properly for 
expenses associated with purchases of inventory and 
thereby violated a specific accounting concept: SFAC No. 6. 
This is an adequate allegation of "how" BCF overstated its 
earnings, so we cannot say that plaintiffs have failed to 
state their claim with adequate particularity. Cf. 
Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 711 (where plaintiffs alleged that 
defendant had arbitrarily moved loans from non-earning to 
earning status just before mandated public reporting, when 
nothing had changed regarding the likelihood of collection 
on the loans, allegations were adequate under Rules 
12(b)(6) and 9(b)). 
 
The district court also ruled that plaintiffs inadequately 
pled scienter. Here, we agree. To satisfy the scienter 
requirement, plaintiffs "must allege facts that give rise to an 
inference that [BCF] knew or was reckless in not knowing 
that [BCF's] financial statements" were misleading. Id. at 
712. It is not enough for plaintiffs to allege generally that 
defendants "knew or recklessly disregarded each of the 
false and misleading statements for which [they were] 
sued," Complaint, ¶ 16; plaintiffs must allege facts that 
could give rise to a "strong" inference of scienter. Suna, 107 
F.3d at 68; San Leandro, 75 F.3d at 813-14. Plaintiffs must 
either (1) identify circumstances indicating conscious or 
reckless behavior by defendants or (2) allege facts showing 
both a motive and a clear opportunity for committing the 
fraud. San Leandro, 75 F.3d at 813. 
 
In this case, plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that 
would constitute circumstantial evidence of reckless or 
conscious misbehavior on the part of defendants in making 
the overstatements of earnings. Cf. id. at 812-13 (describing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
materially misleading. Deviations from accounting standards are 
important insofar as reasonable investors expect those standards to be 
followed. Given that the market expects that a certain set of accounting 
standards will be followed, we imagine that a demonstration of explicit 
compliance with these standards will at least generally negate the 
possibility that reasonable investors were misled. 
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the types of allegations of fact that would indicate 
conscious or reckless behavior). 
 
Plaintiffs have also endeavored to plead scienter by 
alleging facts that point towards motive and opportunity to 
commit fraud. Plaintiffs have alleged (and it is undisputed) 
that the individual defendants were top officers of BCF and 
hence had the opportunity to manipulate BCF's disclosures 
to the public. Id. at 813. In addition, plaintiffs have alleged 
that defendants artificially inflated the price of BCF's stock 
so as to enable certain top BCF officials to sell portions of 
their stock holdings at these prices.12  See Acito v. IMCERA 
Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Plaintiffs may 
plead scienter by alleging `facts establishing a motive to 
commit fraud and an opportunity to do so,' or alleging `facts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Plaintiffs also allege, generally, that the individual officer-defendants 
sought to inflate the company's stock price so as to "protect, perpetuate 
and enhance their executive positions and the substantial compensation, 
prestige and other perquisites of executive employment obtained 
thereby." Complaint, ¶ 15. This general allegation, however, does not 
help plaintiffs in adequately alleging scienter because they fail to explain 
to us how a temporary inflation of BCF's stock price would help 
management increase its compensation or preserve its jobs. Cf. Acito v. 
IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he existence, 
without more, of executive compensation dependent upon stock value 
does not give rise to a strong inference of scienter."); cf. also In re 
HealthCare Compare Corp. Sec. Litig., 75 F.3d 276, 284 (7th Cir. 1996); 
but cf. In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 925 & 931 (9th Cir. 
1993). An example of a situation in which management might be able to 
preserve its compensation and job security by causing a temporary stock 
price increase could be where the incumbent management fears a 
specific takeover bid and is seeking to deter the takeover (by causing the 
target company's stock price to be artificially inflated for a short period). 
See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir. 
1995) (where plaintiffs articulated such a theory); see also HealthCare, 
75 F.3d at 284. As a general matter, though, causing temporary 
inflations of price through the dissemination of false information hurts 
the long-term stock price of the company and thereby presumably hurts 
managerial compensation that may be tied to the long-term performance 
of the company. This is so because these disseminations of false 
information (that are eventually discovered by the market) increase the 
volatility of the company's stock and in turn increase its risk and long- 
term price. Cf. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of 
"Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 Duke L. J. 977, 1025-26 (1992). 
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constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or 
conscious misbehavior.") (quoting In re Time Warner Sec. 
Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also Shaw v. 
Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1224 (1st Cir. 1996). In 
support of this theory, plaintiffs' Complaint provides us 
with the names of the insiders who sold stock, the 
quantities of stock sold and the prices at which the sales 
occurred, and the dates of the sales. Complaint, ¶ 51. 
 
What these allegations boil down to is that two of the five 
officer-defendants made a profit of approximately $100,000 
each and that a third officer-defendant made a profit of 
approximately $40,000 as a result of the artificial inflation 
of the price of BCF's stock. The two officer-defendants who 
are not alleged to have traded are Monroe Milstein, the CEO 
and chairman of the board, who owned 30.7% of BCF's 
stock, and Stephen Milstein, a vice-president and general 
merchandise manager, who owned 4.9% of the stock. 
 
Of the three defendants who are alleged to have traded 
on nonpublic information, plaintiffs have provided us with 
the total stock holdings of only one defendant. This 
defendant, Andrew Milstein, owned 5.4% of the stock. The 
Complaint tells us that as of May 11, 1994, there were 
41,119,463 shares of BCF's common stock outstanding. A 
5.4% holding, therefore, translates to approximately 
2,220,451 shares. Of these, Andrew Milstein is alleged to 
have profited on the sale of 10,000 shares, i.e., 
approximately 0.5% of his holdings. With respect to the 
other two officer-defendants who are alleged to have traded 
on the nonpublic information, the Complaint provides us 
with the number of shares they traded, but not what their 
total stock holdings were. 
 
These allegations are inadequate to produce a "strong" 
inference of "fraudulent intent." See San Leandro, 75 F.3d 
at 814. First, two officer-defendants are not alleged to have 
traded at all, and these two defendants appear to be two of 
the more powerful among the group of five. One of them 
was the CEO, chairman of the board, and holder of over 
30% of the stock. Second, the one defendant for whom we 
have information as to his total stock holdings appears to 
have sold no more than a minute fraction of his holdings, 
0.5%. Further, we have no information as to whether such 
 
                                21 
trades were normal and routine for this defendant. Nor do 
we have information as to whether the profits made were 
substantial enough in relation to the compensation levels 
for any of the individual defendants so as to produce a 
suspicion that they might have had an incentive to commit 
fraud. Finally, for two of the officer-defendants who are 
alleged to have traded during the class period, we do not 
even have information as to their total BCF stock holdings, 
and we therefore have even less of a basis to infer that their 
sales were unusual or suspicious. To the extent plaintiffs 
choose to allege fraudulent behavior based on what they 
perceive as "suspicious" trading, they have to allege facts 
that support that suspicion. 
 
A large number of today's corporate executives are 
compensated in terms of stock and stock options. Cf. Elliott 
J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: 
Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 675, 687 
(1996). It follows then that these individuals will trade 
those securities in the normal course of events. We will not 
infer fraudulent intent from the mere fact that some officers 
sold stock. See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1224; cf. Tuchman, 14 
F.3d at 1068 (noting that if "incentive compensation" could 
be the basis for an allegation of fraud, "the executives of 
virtually every corporation in the United States would be 
subject to fraud allegations") (citation omitted). Instead, 
plaintiffs must allege that the trades were made at times 
and in quantities that were suspicious enough to support 
the necessary strong inference of scienter. See Shaw, 82 
F.3d at 1224; see also Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 
1068 (7th Cir. 1995); cf. Weiss, Securities Fraud Pleading at 
686-87 (question courts should ask is whether the benefits 
realized by executives as a result of the inflation in stock 
price are "sufficiently large to constitute evidence of motive" 
to commit fraud). 
 
We conclude, therefore, that while dismissal on Rule 
12(b)(6) alone would not have been proper, the dismissal on 
Rule 9(b) grounds was. We do not discard the possibility, 
however, that plaintiffs will be able to amend the Complaint 
to allege trading by the defendant-officers that adequately 
supports the requisite strong inference of scienter. 
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(2) The 53rd Week 
 
Fiscal year 1993 for BCF contained an extra, 53rd week. 
In its 1993 annual report, filed with the SEC on October 4, 
1993, BCF represented that this 53rd week had accounted 
for an increase of $12.2 million in sales. Specifically, the 
1993 annual report stated: 
 
Fiscal 1993 was a 53 week fiscal year compared with 
52 week fiscal years in 1992 and 1991. Net sales for 
the 53rd week in fiscal 1993 amounted to $12.2 
million. 
 
(Dist. Ct. Op. at 15). According to plaintiffs, however, this 
statement was false when made. Claiming that the true 
increase in sales attributable to the 53rd week was $23.2 
million, not $12.2 million, plaintiffs rely on the following 
statement made by BCF in a September 20, 1994, press 
release: 
 
[T]he fourth quarter of 1994 was a 13 week quarter 
compared with a 14 week fiscal quarter in 1993. This 
extra week, a year ago, added $23.2 million in sales, 
and approximately $5 million in pre-tax profit, to 
1993's fourth quarter. 
 
(Dist. Ct. Op. at 15). 
 
Plaintiffs claim that BCF's initial understatement of the 
effect of the 53rd week caused investors materially to 
overestimate BCF's future prospects. Complaint,¶ 35. 
 
The two BCF statements on which plaintiffs rely appear 
to be inconsistent with respect to the effect of the 53rd 
week. The district court, however, found them consistent 
and consequently rejected plaintiffs' claim. The court 
explained: 
 
The 1993 Annual Report and the September 20, 1994 
press release compare two separate periods. The 1993 
Annual Report focuses on the week of June 27, 1993 to 
July 3, 1993 as the extra, non-comparable week 
between fiscal 1992 and fiscal 1993. That week, which 
was the fifty-third week in fiscal 1993, accounted for 
$12.2 million in sales. The September 20, 1994 press 
release, however, focuses on another week -- that of 
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March 28, 1993 to April 3, 1993 -- as the non- 
comparable week between fifty-three-week fiscal 1993 
and fiscal 1994, which had only fifty-two weeks. 
 
(Dist. Ct. Op. at 16) (emphasis added; internal citations 
omitted). 
 
Unlike the district court, we see nothing in the 1993 
Annual Report or the September 20, 1994, press release 
that makes clear that the 53rd weeks discussed in the two 
documents were two different calendar weeks fromfiscal 
year 1993. As far as we can see, the only source of 
information before the district court that could have 
provided a basis for the conclusion it reached was 
defendants' brief in support of their motion to dismiss. 
Indeed, the district court's opinion specifically cites to an 
affidavit proffered by defendants on this point. (Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 16). However, since the district court was ruling on 
a motion to dismiss, it was not permitted to go beyond the 
facts alleged in the Complaint and the documents on which 
the claims made therein were based. See Angelastro v. 
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 
1985); see also In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 
F.3d 357, 368 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, if we stopped our 
analysis here, we would have to reverse the district court's 
dismissal of this claim. There is an alternative basis, 
however, that warrants affirmance of the district court's 
decision. 
 
The district court's opinion notes that, on July 29, 1994, 
approximately two months prior to the September 20 press 
release (where it was disclosed that the 53rd week of 1993 
accounted for $23.2 million in sales), BCF had disclosed 
the information as to the $23.2 million in sales. (Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 16). Plaintiffs' Complaint tells us that this 
information, when released to the public, had "no 
appreciable effect on the market price of BCF common 
stock or on analysts' projections [as to the company's 
earnings for the year]." Complaint, ¶ 57. Plaintiffs' 
Complaint also informs us that BCF's stock was actively 
traded and carefully followed by market analysts and that 
the market for BCF stock was "efficient." Complaint, ¶ 23. 
 
Because the market for BCF stock was "efficient" and 
because the July 29 disclosure had no effect on BCF's 
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price, it follows that the information disclosed on 
September 20 was immaterial as a matter of law. 
Ordinarily, the law defines "material" information as 
information that would be important to a reasonable 
investor in making his or her investment decision. See 
Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 714. In the context of an 
"efficient" market, the concept of materiality translates into 
information that alters the price of the firm's stock. Cf. 
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1218 (in cases involving the fraud on the 
market theory of liability, statements identified as 
actionably misleading are alleged to have caused injury, 
"not through the plaintiffs' direct reliance upon them, but 
by dint of the statements' inflating effect on the price of the 
security purchased") (emphasis added); Raab v. General 
Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 1993) (" `Soft', 
`puffing' statements . . . generally lack materiality because 
the market price of a share is not inflated by vague 
statements predicting growth") (emphasis added). This is so 
because efficient markets are those in which information 
important to reasonable investors (in effect, the market, see 
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1218) is immediately incorporated into 
stock prices. See Langevoort, Market Efficiency, at 851; see 
also Roots Partnership v. Lands' End, Inc., 965 F.2d 1411, 
1419 (7th Cir. 1992); Wielgos, 892 F.3d at 510 ("The 
Securities and Exchange Commission believes that markets 
correctly value the securities of well-followedfirms, so that 
new sales may rely on information that has been digested 
and expressed in the security's price."). Therefore, to the 
extent that information is not important to reasonable 
investors, it follows that its release will have a negligible 
effect on the stock price. In this case, plaintiffs have 
represented to us that the July 29 release of information 
had no effect on BCF's stock price. This is, in effect, a 
representation that the information was not material. See 
Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, at 909-910; cf. Roots 
Partnership, 965 F.2d at 1419 (plaintiff asserting fraud on 
the market theory claimed to have been misled into 
purchasing company's securities on July 25, 1989 by 
earnings projection for the first quarter that was made on 
April 4, 1989; claim failed because company had disclosed 
its actual first quarter earnings on May 18 , 1989 and under 
plaintiffs' own efficient market theory this information 
 
                                25 
should have been incorporated into the price prior to 
plaintiff's purchase on July 25). If the July 29 information 
was immaterial, its nondisclosure in the 1993 Annual 
Report is not actionable. 
 
(3) Reduced Supplier Discounts 
 
Plaintiffs assert that "BCF purchased the bulk of its 
inventory of coats for 1994 in January and February 1994, 
yet defendants failed to disclose in its statements and 
reports from March 1, 1994 to September 23, 1994, that 
the discounts received were substantially less than in prior 
years." Complaint, ¶ 73(b). In order for an omission or 
misstatement to be actionable under Section 10(b) it is not 
enough that plaintiff identify the omission or misstatement. 
The omission or misstatement must also be material, i.e., 
something that would alter the total mix of relevant 
information for a reasonable investor making an investment 
decision. See Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 714. Although 
questions of materiality have traditionally been viewed as 
particularly appropriate for the trier of fact, complaints 
alleging securities fraud often contain claims of omissions 
or misstatements that are obviously so unimportant that 
courts can rule them immaterial as a matter of law at the 
pleading stage. See, e.g., Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1217-18; 
Glassman, 90 F.3d at 635. Along these lines, the district 
court rejected plaintiffs' claim predicated on the 
undisclosed supplier discounts. The court made its ruling 
on the ground that the allegedly omitted information was 
too immaterial to form the basis for a legally viable claim. 
 
There is a threshold procedural question that we must 
address before reaching the merits of the district court's 
decision on materiality. Plaintiffs claim that the district 
court committed reversible error in using information 
contained in BCF's 1994 Annual Report as a basis for its 
materiality analysis because the 1994 Annual Report was 
neither attached to, nor referred to, in the Complaint. 
 
As a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion 
to dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the 
pleadings. Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 944. However, an 
exception to the general rule is that a "document integral to 
or explicitly relied upon in the complaint" may be 
 
                                26 
considered "without converting the motion [to dismiss] into 
one for summary judgment." Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1220 
(emphasis added); see also Trump, 7 F.3d at 368 n.9 ("a 
court may consider an undisputedly authentic document 
that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to 
dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the 
document.") (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White 
Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 
The rationale underlying this exception is that the 
primary problem raised by looking to documents outside 
the complaint -- lack of notice to the plaintiff-- is 
dissipated "[w]here plaintiff has actual notice . . . and has 
relied upon these documents in framing the complaint." 
Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting 
Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d 
Cir. 1991)); see also San Leandro, 75 F.3d at 808-09. What 
the rule seeks to prevent is the situation in which a plaintiff 
is able to maintain a claim of fraud by extracting an 
isolated statement from a document and placing it in the 
complaint, even though if the statement were examined in 
the full context of the document, it would be clear that the 
statement was not fraudulent. See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1220. 
 
As best we can tell, plaintiffs are correct that the 
Complaint does not explicitly refer to or cite BCF's 1994 
Annual Report. But the language in both Trump  and Shaw 
makes clear that what is critical is whether the claims in 
the complaint are "based" on an extrinsic document and 
not merely whether the extrinsic document was explicitly 
cited. See Trump, 7 F.3d at 368 n.9; Shaw, 82 F.3d at 
1220. Plaintiffs cannot prevent a court from looking at the 
texts of the documents on which its claim is based by 
failing to attach or explicitly cite them. 
 
In this case, every time in the Complaint that plaintiffs 
refer to their claim that data as to lower discounts in 
January-February 1994 was required to be disclosed, but 
was not, plaintiffs support their claim by arguing that the 
data as to the January-February period was crucial to 
investors because this was the period during which BCF 
purchased the bulk of its 1994 inventory. Complaint,¶¶ 50, 
54(b), 62, 73(b). This is an unambiguous reference to full- 
year cost data for 1994. The Complaint, however, does not 
 
                                27 
provide a citation for the source of full-year data for 1994. 
In the absence of such a citation, we think it was 
reasonable for the district court to have looked to the 1994 
Annual Report that defendants provided. 
 
Plaintiffs next argue that, even if consideration of the 
1994 Annual Report were legitimate, the district court erred 
in dismissing their claim. The district court reasoned that 
to the extent the allegedly lower discounts in January- 
February 1994 were relevant to investors, they would be 
reflected in the 1994 "costs of goods sold." (Dist. Ct. Op. at 
12). Plaintiffs assert that the court erred in looking at total 
costs. We disagree. 
 
As previously noted, reasonable investors often rely on 
estimates of a firm's future earnings in deciding whether to 
invest in a firm's securities. See Glassman, 90 F.3d at 626. 
A reduction in discounts received on merchandise 
purchases would be material if it affected total costs and 
therefore earnings. In evaluating the materiality of the 
allegedly undisclosed lower discounts, therefore, the district 
court correctly looked to the effect of these allegedly lower 
discounts on total costs. The impact was negligible; total 
costs between 1993 and 1994 increased only 0.2%, and 
many factors other than merchandise discounts go into 
total costs. Where the data alleged to have been omitted 
would have had no more than a negligible impact on a 
reasonable investor's prediction of the firm's future 
earnings, the data can be ruled immaterial as a matter of 
law. Cf. Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 714-15 (where plaintiffs 
alleged misstatements regarding loan loss reserves, but the 
claim was based on a failure to do a single write down that 
would have produced no more than a 0.54% change in the 
firm's net income, claim could be ruled immaterial as a 
matter of law); Glassman, 90 F.3d at 633 (where allegedly 
undisclosed information as to quarter-to-quarter changes in 
backlog was no more than a few percent, the claim of 
nondisclosure could be ruled immaterial as a matter of 
law). Hence, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this 
claim. 
 
(4) & (5) Forward-Looking Statements 
 
Plaintiffs allege that BCF misrepresented its future 
prospects to the public by making two forward-looking 
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statements that lacked a reasonable basis. The federal 
securities laws do not obligate companies to disclose their 
internal forecasts. See In re Lyondell Petrochemical Co. Sec. 
Litig., 984 F.2d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 1993); see also 
Glassman, 90 F.3d at 631; Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1209. 
However, if a company voluntarily chooses to disclose a 
forecast or projection, that disclosure is susceptible to 
attack on the ground that it was issued without a 
reasonable basis. See In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 
628, 645-46 (3d Cir. 1990); Herskovitz v. Nutri/System, 
Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Searls v. Glasser, 64 
F.3d 1061, 1067 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Before management 
releases estimates to the public, it must ensure that the 
information is reasonably certain. If it discloses the 
information before it is convinced of its certainty, 
management faces the prospect of liability.") (citations 
omitted). The two forward-looking statements that plaintiffs 
attack are (1) a representation that BCF "believe[d] [it could] 
continue to grow net earnings at a faster rate than sales," 
and (2) a BCF officer's expression of "comfort" with analyst 
projections of $1.20 to $1.30 as a mid-range for earnings 
per share for fiscal year 1994. Complaint, ¶ 36. We examine 
the statements in turn, concluding that while the claims as 
to both were properly dismissed, plaintiffs should be given 
leave to amend their claims as to one. 
 
Statement of Belief 
 
BCF's Chief Accounting Officer's statement on November 
1, 1993, that the company "believe[d] [it could] continue to 
grow net earnings at a faster rate than sales" can be broken 
down into two component parts. First, that as of November 
1, 1993, the company's earnings had grown at a faster rate 
than sales, and second, that the company believed that this 
trend would continue. As to the first part of the statement, 
plaintiffs have not alleged that as of November 1, 1993, 
earnings had not been growing faster than sales. Instead, 
plaintiffs' claim focuses on the second portion of the 
statement -- the forward-looking portion. 
 
The forward-looking portion of the statement here is a 
general, non-specific statement of optimism or hope that a 
trend will continue. Claims that these kinds of vague 
expressions of hope by corporate managers could dupe the 
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market have been almost uniformly rejected by the courts. 
See San Leandro, 75 F.3d at 811 (subdued, generally 
optimistic statements constituted nothing more than 
puffery and were not actionable); see also Shapiro v. UJB 
Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 283 n.12 (3d Cir. 1992); 
Glassman, 90 F.3d at 636; Searls, 64 F.3d at 1066; Hillson 
Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 212 
(4th Cir. 1994) (deeming prediction of "significant sales 
gains . . . as the year progresses" too vague to be material). 
We agree, and thus hold that the statement at issue is too 
vague to be actionable. Moreover, to the extent plaintiffs are 
asserting that there was either a duty to correct or update 
the forward-looking portion of the statement,13 those claims 
fail on account of the original statement's vagueness and 
resultant immateriality. See Gross v. Summa Four, Inc., 93 
F.3d 987, 994-95 (1st Cir. 1996); Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1219 
n.33 (cautiously optimistic statements, expressing at most 
a hope for a positive future, do not trigger a duty to 
update); In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 
(2d Cir. 1993) (statements at issue lacked "definite positive 
projections" of the sort that might require later correction), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994). 
 
Expression of Comfort 
 
The second forward-looking statement at issue is BCF's 
Chief Accounting Officer's statement during a securities 
analysts' conference that he was "comfortable" with 
analysts' estimates of $1.20 to $1.30 as a mid-range for 
fiscal 1994 earnings per share. This statement was reported 
by Reuters on November 1, 1993. Plaintiffs assert (1) that 
this statement was actionable because it was not made 
with a reasonable basis, and (2) that BCF failed to fulfill its 
duty to correct this unreasonable forecast in the period 
following November 1, 1993. The district court, however, 
ruled that a corporate officer's expression of comfort with 
an analyst's projection of earnings cannot be the basis for 
a Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5 claim. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that statements of opinion 
by top corporate officials may be actionable if they are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. As the district court noted, the Complaint is hardly a model of 
clarity. 
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made without a reasonable basis. See Virginia Bankshares, 
Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1098 (1991); see also 
Trump, 7 F.3d at 372 n.14 (applying the rationale of 
Virginia Bankshares, a Section 14(a) proxy solicitation case, 
to the Section 10(b) context); Glassman, 90 F.3d at 627. In 
particular, in Virginia Bankshares, the Court held 
actionable a board of directors' expression of opinion 
concerning a specific merger price. Id. at 2758-59 (board of 
directors expressed the opinion that merger price was 
"fair"); see also Glassman, 90 F.3d at 627 (holding 
actionable representations by the company and its 
underwriters that the prices for a public offering were fair 
and estimated based on the most current information 
available at the time of the offering). As explained by the 
Court in Virginia Bankshares, statements of opinion by 
corporate officials can be materially significant to investors 
because investors know that these top officials have 
knowledge and expertise far exceeding that of the ordinary 
investor. 501 U.S. at 1090-91; see also Glassman, 90 F.3d 
at 631. The rationale of Virginia Bankshares is applicable 
here, where BCF's Chief Accounting Officer expressed his 
agreement with certain projections by analysts.14 
 
The district court rejected plaintiffs' claim on the ground 
that a company is not liable for an analyst's projection 
unless the company expressly "adopted or endorsed" the 
analyst's report. (Dist. Ct. Op. at 10, citing Weisbergh v. St. 
Jude Medical, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 638, 644 (D. Minn. 1994) 
("This Court will not hold defendants responsible for the 
projections of market analysts absent an indication that 
defendants were responsible for the projections or in a 
position to influence or control them"), aff'd, 62 F.3d 1422 
(8th Cir. 1985) and Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 
286, 288 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The securities laws require 
General Physics to speak truthfully to investors; they do 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Certain vague and general statements of optimism have been held 
not actionable as a matter of law because they constitute no more than 
"puffery" and are understood by reasonable investors as such. See, e.g., 
San Leandro, 75 F.3d at 810. The puffery defense does not apply here 
since the expression of comfort was not vague; it was an agreement with 
a specific forecast range. Cf. Glassman, 90 F.3d at 636 (distinguishing 
vague statements of optimism from specific projections). 
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not require the company to police statements made by third 
parties for inaccuracies, even if the third party attributes 
the statement to General Physics)). Although we have no 
problem with the "adopt or endorse" test, we disagree with 
its application here. 
 
To say that one is "comfortable" with an analyst's 
projection is to say that one adopts and endorses it as 
reasonable. When a high-ranking corporate officer explicitly 
expresses agreement with an outside forecast, that is close, 
if not the same, to the officer's making the forecast.15 We 
see no reason why adopting an analyst's forecast by 
reference should insulate an officer from liability where 
making the same forecast would not. 
 
The cases the district court cites in support of its 
conclusion concern attacks on statements by analysts and 
claims that those statements should be attributed to the 
defendant company because the company allegedly 
provided the analysts with information. See Raab, 4 F.3d at 
288; Weisbergh, 158 F.R.D. at 643. Plaintiffs' claim here, 
however, is not an indirect attempt to attribute an analyst's 
prediction to the company where the company itself has 
made no explicit statement (for example, because the 
company provided the analyst with all the relevant data or 
somehow controlled what the analyst was doing). Instead, 
plaintiffs directly attack BCF's CAO's own statement, as it 
was reported by Reuters. The attribution issue does not 
arise because at this stage we take as true the allegation 
that BCF's CAO did express comfort with the analyst 
projections at issue. Cf. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 
F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980) ("attribution" question is 
answered by asking whether company officials have, 
expressly or impliedly, made a representation that the 
analyst projections are in accordance with their views); In re 
Adobe Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., 767 F. Supp. 1023, 1027-28 
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (denying motion to dismiss where 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. This is not to discount the possibility of situations where the 
expression of agreement is so unenthusiastic that no reasonable investor 
would attach relevance to it. Here, however, as alleged by plaintiffs, the 
CAO's expression of comfort was enthusiastic enough that we cannot 
deem it immaterial as a matter of law. 
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corporate officer stated he "preferred" certain analyst 
estimates to others). Put differently, it is a statement by a 
BCF officer itself that is being attacked, not an analyst's 
statement.16 
 
The next question for us is whether there are sufficient 
factual allegations supporting plaintiffs' theory for the claim 
to survive the Rule 9(b) hurdle. To adequately state a claim 
under the federal securities laws, it is not enough merely to 
identify a forward-looking statement and assert as a general 
matter that the statement was made without a reasonable 
basis. Instead, plaintiffs bear the burden of "plead[ing] 
factual allegations, not hypotheticals, sufficient to 
reasonably allow the inference" that the forecast was made 
with either (1) an inadequate consideration of the available 
data or (2) the use of unsound forecasting methodology. 
Glassman, 90 F.3d at 628-29 (rejecting plaintiffs' earnings 
projection claim on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds alone, albeit in 
the context of the plaintiffs having had the benefit of full 
discovery); cf. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1092-94 
(describing the type of hard contemporaneous facts that 
could show an opinion as to the fairness of a suggested 
price to have been unreasonable when made); cf. also 
Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 284-85 (in attacking afirm's 
accounting practices with a claim that those practices 
resulted in the disclosure of misleading data, plaintiffs 
must (a) identify what those practices are and (b) specify 
how they were departed from)). In deciding a motion to 
dismiss, a court must take well-pleaded facts as true but 
need not credit a complaint's "bald assertions" or "legal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The district court also noted that the earnings projections of $1.20- 
$1.30 per share for fiscal 1994 were not materially off the mark in that 
earnings turned out to be $1.12 per share. But this is an ex post 
justification. Securities laws approach matters from an ex ante 
perspective. See Pommer, 961 F.2d at 623. The fact that we see in 
hindsight that earnings per share did in fact turn out to be roughly 
within the range they were projected does not tell us conclusively that 
the forecasts were reasonable at the time they were made. Cf. Glassman, 
90 F.3d at 627 ("[W]hile forecasts are not actionable merely because they 
do not come true, they may be actionable because they are not 
reasonably based on, or are inconsistent with, the facts at the time the 
forecast is made."). 
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conclusions." Glassman, 90 F.3d at 628. In this case, 
plaintiffs identified the offending forecasts and then alleged: 
 
The foregoing statements were materially false and 
misleading when made since, at the time they were 
made, defendants knew, or recklessly disregarded, that 
their public statements and statements to analysts 
promoting BCF and its stock would artificially maintain 
and inflate the market price of BCF's common stock 
due to the false and misleading positive assurances 
contained therein. In particular, defendants had no 
reasonable basis to state publicly on November 1, 
1993, and not to correct the November 1, 1993 
statement in subsequent forward-looking projections, 
that Burlington Coat Factory would earn between 
$1.20 to $1.30 per share in fiscal year 1994 . . .. 
 
Complaint, ¶ 37. 
 
Plaintiffs' allegations do not suffice. In asserting that 
there was "no reasonable basis" for the November 1, 1993, 
earnings projection, plaintiffs simply mouth the required 
conclusion of law. See Glassman, 90 F.3d at 629-30. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint contains a number of vague factual 
assertions regarding the period prior to November 1, 1993, 
but plaintiffs have failed to link any of these allegations to 
their claim that the November 1 forecast was actionably 
unsound when made. The earnings projection claim 
therefore fails Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements. 
 
The existence of these unlinked factual allegations, 
however, precludes us from holding that the Complaint is 
so bereft of facts, as the Glassman complaint was held to 
be, see id., that granting plaintiffs the opportunity to 
replead would be futile. On remand, therefore, plaintiffs 
should be given the opportunity to attempt to recast this 
claim in terms that satisfy Rule 9(b). 
 
We turn next to the duties to correct and update an 
earnings projection. 
 
Duties to Update and Correct 
 
Plaintiffs also assert that BCF had a duty to correct the 
November 1, 1993, expression of comfort with the analysts' 
projections. In particular, plaintiffs point to the refusal of 
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BCF's CEO, Monroe Milstein, in an interview given to 
Reuters --reported on March 22, 1994 -- to comment on 
analysts' earnings projections for both the third quarter of 
1994 and the full year. Plaintiffs assert that on March 22, 
1994, and at other unspecified points in time after 
November 1, 1993, defendants had had a duty to correct 
the November 1 earnings projection.17 Although plaintiffs 
characterize their claim as a "duty to correct" claim, they 
appear to be asserting both a duty to correct and a duty to 
update. 
 
The Seventh Circuit explained in Stransky v. Cummins 
Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329 (7th Cir. 1995), that the duty 
to correct is analytically different from the duty to update, 
although litigants, as appears to be the case here, often fail 
to distinguish between the two. Id. at 1331. As the Stransky 
court pointed out, a Section 10(b) plaintiff ordinarily is 
required to identify a specific statement made by the 
company and then explain either (1) how the statement was 
materially misleading or (2) how it omitted a fact that made 
the statement materially misleading. Id. The duties to 
update and correct are two other avenues of finding a duty 
to disclose that "have been kicked around by courts, 
litigants and academics alike." Id.; cf. William B. Gwyn, Jr. 
and W. Christopher Matton, The Duty to Update the 
Forecasts, Predictions, and Projections of Public Companies, 
24 Sec. Reg. L. J. 366 (1997); Robert H. Rosenblum, An 
Issuer's Duty Under Rule 10b-5 to Correct and Update 
Materially Misleading Statements, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 289 
(1991). 
 
(a) Duty to Correct 
 
The Stransky court articulated the duty to correct as 
applying: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Plaintiffs suggest that by March 22, 1994, analysts' projections for 
BCF's 1994 earnings per share had risen above the $1.20 to $1.30 mid- 
range with which BCF's CAO had expressed comfort some months prior. 
Complaint ¶ 49. The fact that analysts' projections independently 
increased above the predicted range, however, has no relevance to the 
claim at hand because plaintiffs have not identified any free-standing 
duty on the part of a public company to "police" the forecasts being 
made by analysts. See Raab, 4 F.3d at 288 (no duty to police statements 
by third parties). 
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when a company makes a historical statement that, at 
the time made, the company believed to be true, but as 
revealed by subsequently discovered information 
actually was not. The company then must correct the 
prior statement within a reasonable time. 
 
51 F.3d at 1331-32 (emphasis added); see also Backman v. 
Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1990) (in banc) 
("Obviously, if a disclosure is in fact misleading when 
made, and the speaker thereafter learns of this, there is a 
duty to correct it.") (emphasis added). We have no quarrel 
with the Stransky articulation, except to note that we think 
the duty to correct can also apply to a certain narrow set 
of forward-looking statements. We will attempt to illustrate 
the kinds of circumstances we have in mind with an 
example. 
 
Imagine the following situation. A public company in 
Manhattan makes a forecast that appears to it to be 
reasonable at the time made. Subsequently, the company 
discovers that it misread a vital piece of data that went into 
its forecast. Perhaps a fax sent by the company's factory 
manager in some remote location was blurry and was 
reasonably misread by management in Manhattan as 
representing sales for the past quarter as 100,000 units as 
opposed 10,000 units. Manhattan management then makes 
an erroneous forecast based on the information it has at 
the time. A few weeks later, management receives the 
correct sales figures by mail. So long as the correction in 
the sales figures was material to the forecast that was 
disclosed earlier, we think there would likely be a duty on 
the part of the company to disclose either the corrected 
figures or a corrected forecast. In other words, there is an 
implicit representation in any forecast (or statement of 
historical fact) that errors of the type we have identified will 
be corrected. This duty derives from the implicit factual 
representation that a public company makes whenever it 
makes a forecast, i.e., that the forecast was reasonable at 
the time made. What is crucial to recognize is that the 
error, albeit an honest one, was one that had to do with 
information available at the time the forecast was made and 
that the error in the information was subsequently 
discovered. Cf. Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 
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1040, 1043-44 (11th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing between 
information that is subsequently discovered that shows a 
report to have been erroneous at the time made (where a 
duty to correct might exist) and ordinary subsequently 
developing information that might reflect on the report, but 
does not show it to have been inaccurate at the time made 
(where there is no duty to correct)). 
 
Plaintiffs phrase their claim as based on a "duty to 
correct." Earlier in the opinion, we explained that plaintiffs' 
attack on the reasonableness of the earnings forecast failed 
because plaintiffs had not met their duty of pleading an 
adequate set of specific factual allegations from which one 
could reasonably infer that the November 1, 1993, forecast 
was made unreasonably. Similarly, as to the "duty to 
correct" claim, plaintiffs have failed to allege how and what 
the specific error or set of errors might have been that went 
into the November 1, 1993, forecast. Nor have the plaintiffs 
identified the specific times at which those errors were 
discovered, so as to allow correction and trigger defendants' 
alleged duty. Therefore, the "duty to correct" claim (to the 
extent one is being made) fails Rule 9(b)'s pleading 
standards. In any event, we think plaintiffs' claim is better 
characterized as a "duty to update" claim. 
 
(b) Duty to Update 
 
The duty to update, in contrast to the duty to correct, 
concerns statements that, although reasonable at the time 
made, become misleading when viewed in the context of 
subsequent events. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 
F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1984); Backman, 910 F.2d at 17. In 
Greenfield, we explained that updating might be required if 
a prior disclosure "[had] become materially misleading in 
light of subsequent events." 742 F.2d at 758; cf. Time 
Warner, 9 F.3d at 267. However, although we have 
generally recognized that a duty to update might exist 
under certain circumstances, we have not clarified when 
such circumstances might exist. Cf. Phillips, 881 F.2d at 
1245; Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 758-60; Backman, 910 F.2d 
at 17 (the duty arises only under "special circumstances"). 
Specifically, we have not addressed the question whether a 
duty to update might exist for ordinary, run-of-the-mill 
forecasts, such as the earnings projection in this case. 
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At issue here is the statement of BCF's CAO on 
November 1, 1993, that he was comfortable with analyst 
projections of $1.20 to $1.30 as a mid-range for earnings 
per share in fiscal 1994. Plaintiffs' argument appears to be 
that, as BCF obtained information in the period subsequent 
to November 1, 1993, that would have produced a material 
change in the earnings projection for fiscal 1994, there was 
an ongoing duty to disclose this information. In essence 
then, the claim is that the disclosure of a single specific 
forecast produced a continuous duty to update the public 
with either forecasts or hard information that would in any 
way change a reasonable investor's perception of the 
originally forecasted range. We decline to hold that the 
disclosure of a single, ordinary earnings forecast can 
produce such an expansive set of disclosure obligations. 
 
For a plaintiff to allege that a duty to update a forward- 
looking statement arose on account of an earlier-made 
projection, the argument has to be that the projection 
contained an implicit factual representation that remained 
"alive" in the minds of investors as a continuing 
representation. Cf. Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1333 (in 
determining the scope of liability that a forward-looking 
statement can produce, one looks to the implicit factual 
representations therein); Kowal v. MCI Communications 
Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Determining 
whether such a representation is implicit in an ordinary 
forecast is a function of what a reasonable investor expects 
as a result of the background regulatory structure. In 
particular, we note three features of the existing federal 
securities disclosure apparatus: 
 
1. Except for specific periodic reporting requirements 
(primarily the requirements to file quarterly and annual 
reports), there is no general duty on the part of a company 
to provide the public with all material information. See Time 
Warner, 9 F.3d at 267 ("a corporation is not required to 
disclose a fact merely because a reasonable investor would 
very much like to know that fact"). Thus, possession of 
material nonpublic information alone does not create a 
duty to disclose it. See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1202; Roeder v. 
Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980)). 
 
                                38 
2. Equally well settled is the principle that an accurate 
report of past successes does not contain an implicit 
representation that the trend is going to continue, and 
hence does not, in and of itself, obligate the company to 
update the public as to the state of the quarter in progress. 
See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1202; Raab v. General Physics Corp., 
4 F.3d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Convergent 
Technologies Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 513-14 (9th Cir. 
1991) (rejecting plaintiffs' contention that accurate 
reporting of past results "misled investors by implying that 
[the company] expected the upward first quarter trend to 
continue throughout the year"); Zucker v. Quasha, 891 F. 
Supp. 1010, 1015 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 82 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
3. Finally, the existing regulatory structure is aimed at 
encouraging companies to make and disclose internal 
forecasts by protecting them from liability for disclosing 
internal forecasts that, although reasonable when made, 
turn out to be wrong in hindsight. See Stransky, 51 F.3d at 
1333. Companies are not obligated either to produce or 
disclose internal forecasts, and if they do, they are 
protected from liability, except to the extent that the 
forecasts were unreasonable when made. See Glassman, 90 
F.3d at 631. The regulatory structure seeks to encourage 
companies to disclose forecasts by providing companies 
with some protection from liability. However, where it 
comes to affirmative disclosure requirements, the current 
regulatory scheme focuses on backward-looking "hard" 
information, not forecasts. See id. (citing Frank H. 
Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure 
of Corporate Law, 305-06 (1991)). Increasing the obligations 
associated with disclosing reasonably made internal 
forecasts is likely to deter companies from providing this 
information -- a result contrary to the SEC's goal of 
encouraging the voluntary disclosure of company forecasts. 
Cf. Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1333; Raab, 4 F.3d at 290. 
 
Based on features one and two, we do not think it can be 
said that an ordinary earnings projection contains an 
implicit representation on the part of the company that it 
will update the investing public with all material 
information that relates to that forecast. Under existing law, 
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the market knows that companies have neither a specific 
obligation to disclose internal forecasts nor a general 
obligation to disclose all material information. Shaw, 82 
F.3d at 1202 & 1209. We conclude that ordinary, run-of- 
the-mill forecasts contain no more than the implicit 
representation that the forecasts were made reasonably and 
in good faith. Cf. Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1333; Kowal, 16 
F.3d at 1277. Just as the accurate disclosure of a line of 
past successes has been ruled not to contain the 
implication that the current period is going just as well, see 
Gross, 93 F.3d at 994, disclosure of a specific earnings 
forecast does not contain the implication that the forecast 
will continue to hold good even as circumstances change. 
 
Finally, the federal securities laws, as they stand today, 
aim at encouraging companies to disclose their forecasts. A 
judicially created rule that triggers a duty of continuous 
disclosure of all material information every time a single 
specific earnings forecast is disclosed would likely result in 
a drastic reduction in the number of such projections made 
by companies. It is these specific earnings projections that 
are the most useful to investors in deciding whether to 
invest in a firm's securities. Cf. Marx v. Computer Sciences 
Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489 (noting the importance of 
earnings projections to investors who are assessing the 
value of a stock); John S. Poole, Improving the Reliability of 
Management Forecasts, 14 J. Corp. L. 547, 548 & 558 
(1989) (noting both the importance to investors of 
projections of future financial performance and the problem 
of using these forecasts where companies make them 
vague). The only types of projections that would be exempt 
from the duty of continuous disclosure advocated by 
plaintiffs, and hence the only types of projections that 
would likely be disclosed under the rule proposed by 
plaintiffs, would be vague expressions of hope and 
optimism that are of little use to investors. See, e.g., Lewis 
v. Chrysler Corp., 949 F.2d 644, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Raab, 4 F.3d at 289. Therefore, apart from the fact that 
plaintiffs' disclosure theory has no support in the existing 
regulatory structure, adopting it would severely undermine 
the goal of encouraging the maximal disclosure of 
information useful to investors. Cf. Hillson, 42 F.3d at 219 
(increasing the level of liability for projections would 
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produce a result contrary to the goals of full disclosure that 
underlie the federal securities laws). In sum, under the 
existing disclosure apparatus, the voluntary disclosure of 
an ordinary earnings forecast does not trigger any duty to 
update.18 
 
We pause to reemphasize that the circumstances in 
Greenfield and Phillips, two cases in which we recognized 
that a duty to update might exist, were vastly different from 
the situation at hand: the disclosure of an ordinary 
earnings projection. In both Greenfield and Phillips, the 
initial disclosures that were argued to have triggered the 
duty to update involved information about events that 
could fundamentally change the natures of the companies 
involved. Specifically, both cases involved takeover 
attempts, and the plaintiffs were claiming that they should 
have been updated with information as to these attempts. 
See Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 758-59; Phillips, 881 F.2d at 
1239 & 1245.19 Where the initial disclosure relates to the 
announcement of a fundamental change in the course the 
company is likely to take, there may be room to read in an 
implicit representation by the company that it will update 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. We do not need to decide now whether our analysis would differ if 
the context were one in which the company had a pattern or practice of 
disclosing periodic updates any time it made a forecast. Plaintiffs have 
not alleged that BCF had a practice of providing periodic updates on 
earnings projections; nor have they alleged that such was the industry 
or market practice. 
 
19. The "duty to update" claims were eventually rejected in both cases. 
In Greenfield, the court held that there had been no initial statement as 
to the existence of a takeover attempt or merger negotiations that could 
have triggered a subsequent duty. 742 F.2d at 759. In Phillips, although 
there was an initial triggering statement, plaintiffs did not produce 
evidence of any subsequently arising change of intent that might have 
been required to be disclosed. 881 F.2d at 1246. 
 
In addition, it is worth noting that the source of the "duty to update" 
requirement in Phillips was a specific regulation, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1, 
that required that "where `any material change occur[ed] in the facts set 
forth' in a Schedule 13D," a company was required to " `promptly' file `an 
amendment disclosing such change' with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the issuer of the security, and with any exchange on which 
the security is traded." 881 F.2d at 1245. 
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the public with news of any radical change in the 
company's plans -- e.g., news that the merger is no longer 
likely to take place.20 Cf. Phillips, 881 F.2d at 1246 (noting 
that "[f]ew markets shift as quickly and dramatically as the 
securities market, especially where a publicly traded 
company has been `put in play' by a hostile suitor. The . . . 
statements were broad and unequivocal, providing no 
contingency for changing circumstances . . . [and could] 
fairly be read as a statement by the Partnership that, no 
matter what happened, it would not change its 
intentions."). But finding a duty to update a disclosure of a 
takeover threat is a far cry from finding a duty to update a 
simple earnings forecast which, if anything, contains a 
clear implication that circumstances underlying it are likely 
to change. 
 
B. Leave to Amend 
 
Plaintiffs' final contention is that the district court erred 
in denying them leave to replead. The district court granted 
defendants' motion to dismiss on both Rule 12(b)(6) and 
Rule 9(b) grounds. Plaintiffs had requested that, in the 
event their Complaint was dismissed, they be given leave to 
replead. The court, however, dismissed the action in its 
entirety. 
 
As a general matter, we review the district court's denial 
of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. See Lorenz v. CSX 
Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413 (3d Cir. 1993); De Jesus v. Sears 
Roebuck & Co., 87 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1996). Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that "leave[to amend] 
shall be freely given when justice so requires." Glassman, 
90 F.3d at 622. The Supreme Court has cautioned that 
although "the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. We emphasize that we are not saying that once a fundamental 
change is announced the company faces a duty continuously to update 
the public with all material information relating to that change. Instead, 
we think that the duty to update, to the extent it might exist, would be 
a narrow one to update the public as to extreme changes in the 
company's originally expressed expectation of an event such as a 
takeover, merger, or liquidation. But cf. Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., __ 
F.3d __, __ 1997 WL 242251, *8 (7th Cir.) (suggesting that even such a 
narrow duty might not exist). 
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within the discretion of the District Court, . . . outright 
refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason 
appearing for the denial is not an exercise of that 
discretion; it is merely an abuse of that discretion and 
inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules." Forman v. 
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Among the grounds that 
could justify a denial of leave to amend are undue delay, 
bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, and futility. Id.; 
Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 1414; Glassman, 90 F.3d at 622. 
 
The district court made no finding that plaintiffs acted in 
bad faith or in an effort to prolong litigation; nor did the 
court find that defendants would have been unduly 
prejudiced by the amendment. Cf. Glassman, 90 F.3d at 
622. We are left to conclude, therefore, that the denial of 
leave to amend was based on the court's belief that 
amendment would be futile. In fact, in discussing this 
issue, defendants' brief starts out by urging us to affirm the 
district court's denial of leave to amend because"any 
attempted additional amendment of that pleading would be 
futile." (Appellees' Br. at 43) (citation and internal quotation 
omitted). "Futility" means that the complaint, as amended, 
would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. Glassman, 90 F.3d at 623 (citing 3 Moore's Federal 
Practice ¶ 15.08[4], at 15-80 (2d ed. 1993)). In assessing 
"futility," the district court applies the same standard of 
legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing 3 
Moore's at ¶ 15.08[4], at 15-81). The district court here 
rejected plaintiffs' claims on both Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 
9(b) grounds. 
 
Ordinarily where a complaint is dismissed on Rule 9(b) 
"failure to plead with particularity" grounds alone, leave to 
amend is granted. See Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 278; Luce v. 
Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1987); Yoder v. 
Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 561-62 & 
n.6 (2d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). However, the 
Complaint in this case was plaintiffs' second. Further, 
plaintiffs not only had approximately four months between 
the initially filed complaints and the revised, consolidated 
complaint that is at issue here, but the Complaint appears 
to have represented the efforts of not one, but four 
different, law firms. Hence, it is conceivable that the district 
 
                                43 
court could have found undue delay or prejudice to the 
defendants. But the court made no such determination, 
and we cannot make that determination on the record 
before us. Therefore, to the extent we can affirm the district 
court's determinations on Rule 12(b)(b) grounds alone (i.e., 
for futility, see Glassman, 90 F.3d at 623), we shall affirm 
the denial of leave to replead. These claims would not 
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion even if pled with more 
particularity. See Luce, 802 F.2d at 56-57. But, where the 
district court's dismissals can be justified only on Rule 9(b) 
particularity grounds we reverse the denial of leave to 
replead. See id. On the latter set of claims, we borrow the 
words of the Second Circuit that "because we are hesitant 
to preclude the prosecution of a possibly meritorious claim 
because of defects in the pleadings, we believe that the 
plaintiffs should be afforded an additional, albeitfinal 
opportunity, to conform the pleadings to Rule 9(b)." Ross v. 
A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 
IV. 
 
We conclude that the Complaint survives scrutiny under 
Rule 12(b)(6) to the extent that it alleges: (1) that the 
defendants overstated BCF's quarterly income by 2-3 cents 
per share in each quarter of fiscal year 1994; (2) that 
management's expression of "comfort" with analysts' 
projections of a mid-range of earnings of $1.20 to $1.30 per 
share for fiscal 1994 was unreasonable when made. Neither 
of these claims, however, survives Rule 9(b)'s particularity 
requirements.21 Ordinarily, complaints dismissed under 
Rule 9(b) are dismissed with leave to amend. See Luce, 802 
F.2d at 56. As best we can tell from the district court's 
opinion, the reason for the denial of leave to amend here 
appears to be that the court thought plaintiffs had failed 
the threshold burden of stating claims that could survive a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. However, since we hold that the 
above-mentioned claims did pass Rule 12(b)(6) we reverse 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. The duty to update portion of the attack on the earnings projection 
fails altogether as we decline to recognize the existence of such a claim 
for an ordinary earnings forecast. 
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the court's denial of leave to amend on these claims.22 In all 
other respects, we affirm the district court. 
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22. On remand, after plaintiffs tender their proposed amendments, the 
district court shall consider whether the amendments would be futile.                  
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